Lets an application allow or reject a destination URL before the package checks whether its network address is safe. SSRF means server-side request forgery: requests that trick a server into reaching unintended addresses.
defmodule MyApp.WebhookDestinations do
@behaviour AshHooks.DestinationPolicy
# your own rules, evaluated AHEAD of the packaged check
@allow_exact ["https://partner.internal.example/hook"]
@impl true
def check(url, _ctx) when url in @allow_exact, do: :allow
def check("https://" <> _rest, _ctx), do: :default
def check(_denied_scheme, _ctx), do: :deny
endWire it through the worker macro (destination_policy: {MyApp.WebhookDestinations, :check})
or a direct AshHooks.Delivery.run/2 config (destination_policy: {m, f}
or a 2-arity fn). The callback returns one of three decisions:
:allow: the send proceeds; the driver's packaged SSRF gate is skipped for this URL. The HTTP adapter's own resolve-and-pin remains the transport's boundary: an allow for a destination that adapter check would refuse (a loopback forwarder, a private network) needs the adapter's explicit validation override for that delivery too.:deny: terminal: the row dead-letters underdestination_deniedwithout a send.:default: the packaged check runs unchanged (AshHooks.Ssrf.resolve_public/1: validated-unsafe dead-letters, unresolvable retries under its honest label).
The callback receives the endpoint's URL and a context map with
:endpoint_id and :tenant (nil when the run carries none). A callback
that raises, exits, throws, or returns a term outside the decision
vocabulary is CONTAINED as a retryable failure
(destination_policy_failed). The row retries with backoff while you fix
the policy and dead-letters with destination_policy_failed only when it
reaches its attempt ceiling, like any retryable failure.
When no policy is configured, the packaged check runs exactly as before
(the boolean :ssrf_check config keeps its behavior; a configured
:destination_policy takes precedence over it).
Summary
Types
The policy context: identifiers only, never endpoint fields or secrets.
The policy decision: :allow bypasses the packaged gate, :deny is terminal, :default runs it.
Callbacks
Decides whether the packaged send-time SSRF gate admits url. See the
module documentation for the decision vocabulary and containment.